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Philosophia between Greek and Latin culture: naturalized immigrant or eternal 
stranger? 
Michael Trapp 
King's College London 
[This working paper, which is to appear in  F. Mestre and P. Gomez (ed.), Three 
Centuries of Greek Culture under the Roman Empire (Barcelona: Publicacions I 
Edicions del la Universitat de Barcelona, 2013, 29-48; 9788447537174), is 
published here with permission of the publisher.] 
 
Summary.  This chapter argues that comparison of Greek and Roman perceptions 
of philosophy in the early centuries AD reveals both divergences and similarities.  
Philosophia in this period remained on several levels a primarily Greek 
phenomenon, perceived as such by Greeks and Romans alike, and was thus 
naturally implicated in negotiations of identity and difference; it could be used 
both (by Greeks) as a touchstone of true civilization and (by Romans) as a marker 
of pointless over-refinement.  But this apparently straightforward Greek-Roman 
split may in fact mask a deeper similarity; seen from another angle, Roman 
manoeuvrings over philosophy do not contest Greek approaches, but simply repeat 
them with local variations. 
 
Keywords.  philosophy, Romanization, integration, culture, paideia. 
 
One of the principal aims of this volume is to promote reflection on the interplay 
of Greek and Roman (or Greek and Latin) culture and identity over the three 
hundred years between the early second and late fourth centuries AD – in 
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particular, on how the boundary between them was perceived and negotiated then, 
and how it should be perceived and negotiated in modern scholarship.  The 
suggestion that I want to set out in this chapter is that the phenomenon – the 
activity, the institution – of philosophy, philosophia, provides a particularly 
rewarding means by which to pursue this objective1.  As I shall argue, it shows 
how what was, from one point of view, a prized element in a shared Greco-Roman 
culture, could also, from other points of view, remain a bone of contention both 
between the two cultures and within each of them. 
 
A shared heritage 
We should begin by reminding ourselves what philosophia was in this period and 
context: what it had become since Plato and Aristotle, and above all what it had 
become since the developments of the late fourth and early third centuries BC, and 
their consolidation in the Hellenistic period2.   
 
What we have to think in terms of is not some simple, homogeneous entity, but 
rather a complex of products and practices.  Philosophia was, in one aspect, a 
body of propositions (in its own presentation, a body of truths) about ultimates – 
about the real structure of the world, about human nature and fulfilment, about the 
divine, and about reason and reasoning.  At the same time, it was a continuing 
practice of speculation and argument, and equally importantly, a continuing 
                                                
1 The rewriting of this chapter has benefited greatly from comments and advice from other 
participants in the conference, especially Emmanuelle Vallette, Paolo Desideri and David 
Konstan, and from the comments of two anonymous referees. 
2 In what follows, I am summarizing the position set out more fully in Trapp (2007), chs. 
1 and 9.  My focus is deliberately on the structural and institutional aspects of philosophia 
in the post-Hellenistic period, on philosophia from something like a sociological 
viewpoint, rather on the kinds of ideological feature picked out as distinctive of this 
period in Boys-Stones (2001).  Hadot (1996) remains a central work in this area. 
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practice of self-formation – the pursuit of a well-formed and rightly functioning 
personality, adjusted for the achievement of happiness.  It was also a public 
institution, entwined with the public culture, in particular the educational culture, 
of the city, in a landscape of schools, instructors, classes and performance.  And it 
was a tradition – an accumulated body of canonical texts, and a pantheon of 
authoritative past practitioners.  Moreover, to make matters still more interestingly 
complicated, both the present reality and the past tradition were organized not as 
unities, but as fields of diversity and argument: it was written into both the past 
history of philosophia and its current institutional and ideological arrangement that 
philosophers gathered into mutually hostile and fiercely polemical camps, 
challenging the as yet uncommitted to choose between them. 
 
Under this description, it should be evident and uncontroversial that philosophia 
was in some manner part of the shared cultivation of the cultivated élite, Hellenic 
and Roman alike, under the early and high Empire.  Some degree of knowledge of 
this body of material and activity, some deference to it and some willingness to 
engage with it were, if not quite definitional of paideia, at least among its more 
decisive indicators.  It was one of the great cultural products, firmly established in 
the Greek-speaking world by the late Hellenistic period, that Romans had first 
sparred with cautiously in the second century BC, and then set themselves to 
appropriate and assimilate with huge energy and enthusiasm in the first century 
BC.   
 
The story of that Roman assimilation is a well-known one and barely needs 
rehearsing now.  In the accessibly surviving record, it is Cicero and Lucretius who 
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blaze the trail, each of them making it clear that they know very well that they are 
doing something new for Latin culture, both conceptually and linguistically, 
something which they have to argue into the reckoning; but both at the same time 
are emphatically confident in the value of what they are doing, and in the strength 
of its claims on their audiences3.  But we have to remember also the existence of 
such pioneering monuments as Varro's De philosophia, Sallustius's Empedoclea, 
and the more shadowy work of Nigidius Figulus; and the substantial presence of 
émigré Greek philosophoi in late Republican Italy4.   
 
With Seneca, a century further on in time, the need for this mode of pioneering 
apologetic seems to be over; it appears by now to be no longer a question of 
arguing that philosophia ought to matter to the thinking person, but of expounding 
what the modes of attention to it should be.  Thereafter, what look like clear 
indications of acceptance and of achieved assimilation abound: in Seneca's own 
output, in the Stoic succession of Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, in Apuleius, and 
in the philosopher Emperor, Aurelius.  Institutionally, the value of philosophia is 
officially endorsed in the first century AD by the inclusion of philosophoi among 
those qualifying under imperial legislation for immunity from taxation and 
liturgies5; and in the second century by the foundation of the four Imperial chairs 
at Athens6. 
 
                                                
3 On Lucretius's co-option of Epicurean material, see Sedley (1998); the alertest recent 
discussion of Cicero's operations on Greek philosophy is Gildenhard (2007); but see also 
Auvray-Assayas (2005). 
4 For an overview of the territory, see Rawson (1985) 57-60, 94-7 and 282-97; Varro is 
discussed by Tarver (1997); Cicero's famous, and famously tantalizing, reference to the 
Empedoclea of Sallustius comes at Q. Fr. 2.9.3. 
5 On the issue of philosophy and exemptions (ateleia), see Millar (1977), 491-506. 
6 On the Imperial Chairs, see Millar (1977) 502; Hahn (1989) 119-27 (esp. 126-7). 
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On some level or levels, therefore, we are dealing with an Empire-wide 
phenomenon, effortlessly crossing the boundary between Greek and Latin, Eastern 
and Western Empire.  And we might say that this is entirely appropriate to the 
conscious and explicit ideology of philosophia as a universalist calling, rooted in 
shared human nature, and thus blind to accidents of nationality, status and even 
(sometimes) gender.   
 
We might still want to insist there is a class issue: that, whatever philosophers 
themselves might have wished to believe, their product remained overwhelmingly 
the concern and the territory of the moneyed, leisured, politically dominant élite, 
and that as such it was implicated in games of demarcation, exclusion and 
justification, of the kind analysed by Thomas Schmitz in his discussion of the 
social and political importance of sophistic declamation, Bildung und Macht7.  
When Plutarch, at the start of his essay on listening to lectures, encourages his 
addressee Nicander to believe that the turn to philosophy is the only proper way 
for a young adult to signal his maturing as a 'person of good sense', this is 
simultaneously a way of marking out a true élite within the élite, of the really as 
opposed to the only apparently grown up8.  When Apuleius, on trial for alleged 
employment of black magic at Sabratha in 158 AD, pointedly contrasts a 
knowledge of what philosophy in general and Platonism in particular is really 
about with the ignorant misunderstanding of his oafish prosecutors, this is among 
other things an attempt to an attempt to create a bond of superiority – superior 
knowledge and superior sensibility – between himself and the court president, 
                                                
7 Schmitz (1997). 
8 Plutarch, De recta ratione audiendi 1.37c-f. 
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Claudius Maximus9.  When Petronius in the Satyrica makes his character 
Trimalchio imagine his own funerary epitaph, and end it with the words nec 
umquam philosophum audivit – 'he never took any philosophy lessons' – this is 
part of the creation of a portrait of a tasteless, intellectually challenged nouveau 
riche10.  But if both Greek and Roman intellectuals are playing such similar 
demarcation games with philosophy, that arguably only further reinforces the 
impression of a uniform status for it across both the Latin- and the Greek-speaking 
zones of the Empire. 
 
The limits of Romanization 
So far, then, I have been playing along with the suggestion that the case of 
philosophia in the period between, say, 150 BC and 250 AD is closely comparable 
to that of other high-cultural transfusions from Greek to Roman, Latin-speaking 
society over the same period: that like poetry, oratory or historiography, 
philosophy smoothly made the transition from the purely Greek to the jointly 
Greco-Roman, naturalizing into Latin as well as Greek linguistic form.  But the 
moment one phrases the proposition as starkly and directly as that, one is of course 
assailed by the suspicion that this is too crude and sweeping an analysis, and that 
the real situation, more attentively considered, was more complicated and more 
interesting. 
 
In two ways in particular.  First, we are moved to ask more sceptically whether the 
degree of assimilation from Greek into Latin, and into a Roman context, was ever 
as substantial or complete for philosophia as it was for, say, poetry or 
                                                
9 Apuleius Apologia 22, cf. 11-13, 36; cf. Harrison, Hilton and Hunink (2001) 14-16. 
10 Petronius, Satyrica 71. 
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historiography.  Secondly, we may well find ourselves reflecting that there is an 
important contrast between the products themselves: that to a much greater extent 
than was true of the other cultural imports, what was there for assimilation in the 
case of philosophia was already in its own original Greek context a contested and 
a problematic phenomenon rather than a universally acknowledged and valued 
good.  Neither of these two further thoughts in itself is a particularly surprising or 
novel one – the first of them, in particular, about the incompleteness of the Roman 
assimilation of Greek philosophia, ought to look familiar; what is less often done 
is to bring them together, and ask what happens when they are allowed to collide. 
 
Let me begin by amplifying the point about the incompleteness of the 
naturalization.  It can be most simply and strongly made in terms of language.  
Bluntly, Latin does not succeed in making itself a first-order philosophical 
language over the first two, or even three centuries AD.  For all the effort that 
Lucretius, Cicero and their contemporaries put into forging the basis of a Latin 
philosophical vocabulary11, and reproducing syntactical and logical structures 
from the Greek philosophical repertoire, and for all the relative success they 
scored, the impetus was not sustained.  The transition was not made from 
summarizing and reporting Greek philosophical work in Latin, to the widespread 
and systematic production in Latin of originative philosophical work at the highest 
level of sophistication.   
 
The nearest thing to an exception to this dismissive generalization is provided by 
Seneca, with his Moral Epistles, Dialogues, and Natural Questions.  As has been 
                                                
11 On which, see Sedley (1998) 35-61. 
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most carefully and persuasively argued by Brad Inwood, there are moments in all 
of these works at which their author does seem to be making the breakthrough into 
first-order philosophizing, or 'primary philosophy', in Latin.  This is, moreover, not 
just a matter of the inclusion of sporadic passages of original analysis, such as the 
discussions of Platonic ontology and of causation in Epistles 58 and 65, or of 
'preliminary passions' at the beginning of Book 2 of the De Ira, but of the fact that 
in such passages, Seneca gives a positive impression of thinking in Latin, rather 
than systematically referring and deferring to Greek terminology and concepts12.  
However, as Inwood himself makes clear, the performance is not sustained, either 
across Seneca's entire output, or even within one individual work.  It is undeniably 
important that he was capable of such 'episodic outbursts', for our understanding 
both of Seneca's own individual achievement, and of the milieu in which he was 
working: he could evidently assume an audience of philosophically engaged 
readers who were prepared to encounter new conceptual work in Latin, even if 
only in relatively short bursts, rather than looking only to treatises in Greek for this 
dimension of philosophical nourishment.  But equally, the implication seems to be 
that it was only in brief flashes that they were willing to find it, and that Seneca 
himself was willing to produce it.   
 
As Inwood emphasizes, Seneca's Latin philosophising did not spring out of 
nothing13.  It presupposes and builds on precedents set by predecessors one and 
two generations back, who combined self-conscious philosophical commitment 
with the choice of Latin as their professional language, and with whom Seneca 
                                                
12 Inwood (1995) 71-6; on the issue of the originality of Seneca's analysis of anger, see 
also Sorabji (2000) 55-75 and Trapp (2007) 80-2. 
13 Inwood (1995) 64-7, 69-70. 
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himself had direct or indirect family connections: Quintus Sextius, his son Sextius 
(?Niger), and his pupils Cornelius Celsus, Lucius Crassicius and Papirius 
Fabianus, of whom the latter two are on record as having undergone an 
identifiable ‘conversion’ to philosophy, from grammar and rhetoric respectively14.  
But although this gives a context for Seneca's own work, it does not lock it into a 
story of steady progress towards an autonomous Latin philosophical culture.  
There is no indication that anything in the written work of these predecessors came 
up to Senecan standards, and – still more significantly for the argument of this 
chapter – there was to be no subsequent continuation.  Just as a good few of 
Seneca's own teachers, like Sotion and Attalus, seem to have stayed with Greek15, 
so too in the next two generations, significant figures who might have chosen to 
write in Latin did not do so, above all the native Italian Musonius Rufus, and his 
pupil Epictetus16. 
 
Seneca, then, looks like a relatively isolated case, who only partly disturbs the 
proposition that Latin remains in general a secondary philosophical language.  
With other works of the first two centuries AD, the pattern holds securely.  
Apuleius's De deo Socratis, Florida and (if it is really his) De Platone are in their 
different ways very obviously exercises in the repackaging of existing doctrine and 
argument, not in the extending of any major boundaries; so too, more obviously 
                                                
14 The report of Fabianus's 'conversion' is given by the Elder Seneca in Contr. 2 Pref. 1, 
that of Crassicius's in Suetonius De Grammaticis 18; what exactly underlies the cliché in 
each case is, of course, uncertain. 
15 Sotion: Epp. 49.2; 108.17-23; cf. Neue Pauly 11.754-5, sv 'Sotion (I)'.  Attalus: Epp. 
9.7; 63.5-6; 67.15; 72.8; 81.22; 108.3-4, 13, 23; 110.14-20; cf. Seneca Rhetor, Suas. 2.12. 
16 Inwood (1995), 67 (where the somewhat whimsical suggestion that Musonius really 
ought to have used Latin not Greek is supported by a questionable reading of Arrian, 
Discourses of Epictetus 1.17.16). 
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still, the Latin translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo and the peri; 
eJrmhneiva" also preserved in the Apuleian corpus.   
 
It is no escape to plead that all philosophical writing over the first two centuries 
AD was similarly secondary, and working within already established limits, and 
that therefore philosophical discourse of the period in Latin cannot after all be 
placed on a substantially different level from that in Greek.  It is indeed true that in 
some Greek writing of the period – Arrian's Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Maximus 
of Tyre, and some of Plutarch's Moralia – we see work of an essentially derivative 
and secondary kind, packaging and transmitting established truths rather than 
opening new avenues of argument or analysis.  But even in the Moralia, in both 
surviving texts like the essay on the generation of the soul in the Timaeus, and in 
titles of lost works from the Lamprias catalogue17, a more sophisticated and 
technical level of philosophical argument is on display.  And it is clear that the 
more technical level, of first order engagement with doctrinal debate, was amply 
represented over the first and second centuries AD in other Greek philosophical 
writing: above all in the form of commentaries, by the likes of Ariston, 
Andronicus, Boethus, Alexander of Aegae, Aspasius, Taurus, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias – and indeed Seneca's teacher Sotion of Alexandria18.  It is of course 
true that not all philosophical commentaries aimed for the same level of 
conceptual and exegetic sophistication; then as now, some were designedly more 
basic and introductory than others19.  But as recent scholarship has amply 
                                                
17 For example, item 66, On the fact that in Plato's view the Universe had a beginning; or 
item 152, Reply to Chrysippus on the First Consequent. 
18 For a convenient brief account, see Sharples (2007) 510-12. 
19 Much of Aspasius's commentary Nicomachean Ethics 8, for instance, works on a fairly 
straightforward exegetic level, keyed more to the school classroom than to advanced 
scholarly debate; see Barnes (1999) 23-7. 
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demonstrated, it is simply unrealistic to place the commentary as a form of 
philosophical discourse categorically in the same class of the secondary and the 
derivative as the popularizations of an Apuleius or a Dio.  On the contrary, it was 
precisely in (some) commentaries that much of the hard, technical work was being 
done, where philosophy as argumentation was being moved forward20. 
 
This in turn in fact provides us with another way of expressing what was not 
happening in Latin, and at least one of the reasons why.  There were no 
philosophical commentaries in Latin, in which first-order Latin philosophizing 
might develop; and there were none because there were no canonical philosophical 
texts in Latin to be commented on; the notion of Latin commentary on Greek 
canonical texts was simply not one to be entertained.  In similar vein, one might 
also point to the asymmetry in habits of code-switching in philosophical writing in 
the first two centuries AD, whereby Latin authors regularly include words and 
phrases, sometimes longer interpolated chunks, in Greek, while the reverse 
phenomenon, snatches of Latin incorporated into Greek philosophical discourse, is 
never found21. 
 
Linguistically and textually, therefore, philosophia did indeed remain stubbornly 
Greek in its core and primary manifestations.  This primary core was it is true 
entirely accessible to Latin speakers of the educated bilingual elite, who may often 
have begun their learning of Greek almost as early in life as they began their 
                                                
20 For example, Boethus's discussions of Time and Substance as analysed by Gottschalk 
(1990) 75-7; or the disagreement between Aspasius and Andronicus over the definition of 
emotion, as analysed by Sorabji (2000) 133-8. 
21 On code-switching in educated Latin writing, see Adams (2003) 297-356. 
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Latin22; but the sense of a divide cannot but have remained, given the continuing 
sense of Greek as a separate and senior culture.  If we ask if and when this 
linguistic situation eventually began to change, the reasonable answer seems to be 
that it was not until the third and fourth centuries, with the construction of a 
speculative discourse in Latin for Christian purposes.  That is to say, a new 
cultural impetus from outside the old closed system of traditional Greco-Roman 
paideia was needed in order to break the spell and to liberate the potential of Latin 
for philosophical expression – a potential which continued to develop beyond later 
antiquity into the middle ages and the early modern period.  A relatively severe 
view might say that the decisive tipping-point was only reached with Boethius 
(c.480-c.524), and his creation of a body of commentary on Latinized logical 
treatises; but before that hugely important stages in the creation of Latin 
speculative discourse are clearly marked by Augustine and Jerome in the later 
fourth and early fifth centuries, and by the earlier fourth-century translation work 
of the likes of Calcidius and Marius Victorinus. 
 
But the point about the stubbornly persisting Greekness of philosophia in the first 
few centuries AD is not only one about the primary language of expression.  It can 
also be made in terms of institutions and practices.  For all that the reputation and 
status-claims of philosophia were Empire-wide, and could be heard formulated in 
Latin as well as in Greek; for all that the legislation conferring immunities on 
philosophers (along with doctors and grammatici) applied equally to western Latin 
as to eastern Greek civic communities; the simple presence and visibility of 
                                                
22 Quintilian in Inst. 1.1.12-14 may be advocating an enthusiastic, educationalist's 
extreme, but his enthusiasm would be odd if his preferred policy was completely out of 
touch with current norms. 
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philosophers, and the readiness with which they could find the appropriate spaces 
for their activities, were not the same.  Philosophers, and their characteristic modes 
of interaction with those around them seem to have been more marginal and to 
have operated across a narrower range in Latin-speaking than in Greek-speaking 
communities.  A philosopher in a Greek city of the second century could be found 
giving lessons and lectures in both private (or semi-private) and public venues, 
both as long-term resident (sometimes at public expense) and as temporary visitor; 
and he did so in surroundings characteristically marked by the traces of his recent 
and more distant predecessors, in sculpted and inscribed stone, in mosaic and 
painted plaster, and struck on coins.  Philosophers in Latin-speaking cities give the 
impression of having been much less integrated on every level.  The absence of a 
direct Roman-culture equivalent of the gymnasium, which, with its associated 
libraries and meeting- and lecture-rooms, was such an important aspect of the 
enabling physical infrastructure for so much of Hellenic high culture, is an 
important part of the story here, but still only one factor among several23.  It 
mattered also that images of the great philosophers of the past were not displayed 
in such numbers in any Latin-speaking city as in the Greek world, that the word 
philosophus was not to be read a frequently on honorific and commemorative 
inscriptions, and that in physical appearance – live or in effigy – the well-dressed 
philosopher was more manifestly a foreigner in Latinate than in Greek 
surroundings24. 
                                                
23 The question of the public presence of philosophers in Greek cities and in Rome is 
taken up by Hahn (1989) 137-47 and 148-55, but without a direct contrast between the 
two sets of surroundings, and without any consideration of visual and monumental 
cultures. Aspects of the visual dimension are discussed by Zanker (1995), but principally 
on the level of the iconography of individual representations of philosophers; he has little 
to say about the volume of representation in public space and its cumulative effects. 
24 Philosophical dress and coiffure was indeed meant to set the philosophos apart in a 
Greek setting too, as an individual with distinctive loyalties and commitments, but it did 
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The breadth of the gap should not be exaggerated, and there is evidence to suggest 
that it closed to some extent in the course of the first century AD.  Although earlier 
generations of Greek philosophical migrants to Rome, particularly in the first 
century BC, had found their main footholds as recipients of private patronage in 
moneyed houses, rather than as more autonomous participants in the cultural life 
of the city25, it did not take long for some at least of their successors to set up 
separate schools of their own.  Seneca's references to his philosophical mentors in 
particular paint a picture of a range of different venues and styles of interaction26, 
including attending formal classes in just the same style as would be normal in a 
Greek city of the same sort of period.  Thus, when in Ep. 108.3 he describes 
attending the school of the Stoic Attalus, and being first to arrive and last to leave, 
and approaching him with points for discussion 'even when he was taking a walk', 
and adds that Attalus not only tolerated such approaches but positively encouraged 
them, this chimes both with Aulus Gellius's picture of relations between Calvenus 
Taurus and his pupils in Athens a century or so later27, but also with idealizing 
pictures of the philosopher in action given by Plutarch in his De audiendo and An 
seni, which date from rather closer to Seneca's own time28.  Also at around the end 
of the first century, Pliny the Younger's account of the Stoic Euphrates in Epistles 
1.10 gives the impression of a philosopher at Rome who could be encountered and 
                                                                                                                                 
so by modifying Greek norms, so must always have looked a degree less foreign in Greek 
than in Latin surroundings. 
25 See Rawson (1985) 38-42, 56-60; Rawson (1989); Hahn (1989) 148-55; Inwood (1995) 
63-4, citing Donini (1982) ch. 2. 
26 Griffin (1976) 37-43. 
27 Gellius NA 1.9.8; 2.2; 7.10; 7.13; 8.6; 9.5.8; 10.19; 12.5; 17.8; 17.20; 18.10.3-7; 19.6.2-
3; 20.4. 
28 Plutarch, De audiendo 11.43e-f; An seni 26.796de. 
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consulted both in formal scholastic surroundings and in day-to-day social 
encounters29. 
 
However, a gap still remains.  In simple quantitative terms, there must have been 
fewer philosophi about in Latin-speaking than in Greek-speaking communities 
throughout the period we are considering, operating in a more limited range of 
contexts and surroundings.  It would have been easier not to come across them, 
and they would always have looked more exotic and unusual when you did. 
 
Reciprocal perceptions 
Philosophia, then, stands at the edge, and so to speak projects beyond the outer 
edge, of the Roman assimilation of Hellenism; it is the limiting case, the cultural 
element which, in spite of claiming for itself the status of the heart of things, the 
jewel in the crown of true (Hellenic) civilization, did not fully transplant.  If this 
was its position, ad extremum finem, then it is hardly surprising to find philosophia 
caught up in games of definition, from both a Hellenic and a Roman starting-point.  
We move on, then, from the question of linguistic and institutional integration, to 
the question of perceptions. 
 
From a Greek vantage-point, philosophia could be constituted – by those who 
wanted to play the game this way – as one of those tell-tale markers that betrayed 
the ultimate Roman inability to become civilized, and thus their ineradicable 
inferiority in culture if not in power to the Hellenes.  The best known, as well as 
                                                
29 Sherwin-White (1966) 108 dates this letter to some time after January 98.  For 
Euphrates, pupil of Musonius Rufus, see the divergent analyses of Grimal (1955) 380-1 
and Frede (1997). 
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the most spirited, expressions of this perception come in Lucian, in his Nigrinus 
and De Mercede Conductis.  In the Nigrinus, we hear the eponymous philosopher 
drawing a bitter contrast between the ease with which a philosophical soul can 
exist in the enlightened society of Athens, and the contrasting sense of alienness 
and discomfort that assailed him in the corrupt environment of Rome.  He pictures 
his return to Rome as a descent into the Underworld – tivptæ au\tæ, w\ duvsthne, 
lipw;n favo" hjelivoio – and his subsequent decision to withdraw from this 
madhouse into domestic philosophical seclusion is compared both to Hector's 
rescue from the carnage of battle by Zeus, and to Odysseus's escape from the 
Sirens30.  The De Mercede Conductis, for its part, expatiates on the indignities 
inflicted on cultivated Greek intellectuals retained in rich Roman households; they 
are given their place there not because of a genuine interest in and sympathy with 
what they represent, but from a desire for a mere show of culture and depth.  The 
most vivid and telling image in the essay is that of the venerable Stoic 
Thesmopolis prevailed on to carry his employer's wife's lapdog during an outing.  
The pampered pet peers out from the philosopher's cloak just under his bushy 
beard, and does what dogs tend to do.  The mocking reaction that this excites from 
another of the entourage – the unfeeling witticism that the Stoic has gone Cynic – 
only accentuates the atmosphere of alienation and insult31. 
 
On a milder but still significant note, Dio Chrysostom observes in his 
autobiographical Oration 13 that when he travelled from the Greek-speaking 
communities, in which he had begun his transformation from dispossessed exile 
                                                
30 Lucian, Nigrinus 17-20, citing Od. 11.93-4, Il. 11.163-4, and Od. 12.160-200. 
31 Lucian, De mercede conductis 33-4. 
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into philosopher, to Rome, he was no longer able to engage in the same style of 
philosophical interaction with those around him as before. 
 
ou{tw dh; kai; ejgw; ejpeirwvmhn dialevgesqai   JRwmaivoi", ejpeidhv me 
ejkavlesan kai; levgein hjxivoun, ouj kata; duvo kai; trei'" ajpolambavnwn ejn 
palaivstrai" kai; peripavtoi": ouj ga;r h\n dunato;n ou{tw" ejn ejkeivnh/ th'/ 
povlei suggivgnesqai: polloi'" te kai; ajqrovoi" eij" taujto; suniou'sin, o{ti 
devontai paideiva" kreivttono" kai; ejpimelestevra", eij mevllousin 
eujdaivmone" e[sesqai tw'/ o[nti katæ ajlhvqeian, ajlla; mh; dovxh/ tw'n pollw'n 
ajnqrwvpwn, w|sper nu'n: .... 
 
And thus it came about that I too endeavoured to talk to the Romans 
when they summoned me and invited me to speak.  I did not see them in 
little groups of two or three in palaestrae and peripatoi, as it was not 
possible to adopt that mode of association in that city; instead I 
addressed them in large groups gathered together, telling them that they 
needed a more masterly and more painstaking education, if they were 
ever to be happy in truth and reality and not merely in the opinion of the 
majority, as was now the case; ….. 32 
 
Speaking to a Greek audience – whether in his home town of Prusa or elsewhere – 
Dio both boasts of his own pulling power as speaker, and reminds them that even 
so, Rome is not as well organized as they are for the reception of this kind of 
teaching33.  This does not carry the same charge of scorn as Lucian's satirical 
                                                
32 Dio Or. 13.31. 
33 The title given to this oration in the manuscripts does indeed allege it to have been 
delivered in Athens, but I believe this to be a misapprehension, based on the depiction of 
Socrates within the speech. 
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depictions, but it does still establish a status difference between Greek and Roman 
receptiveness to philosophical culture, in a fairly pointed way34. 
 
On the Roman side of the fence, it is equally easy to find an answering readiness 
to use the rejection, or at any rate the restriction of philosophia as a means of 
articulating Roman-ness.  The most striking examples are hugely familiar, and 
often cited: Tacitus's Agricola, recalling how in his enthusiastic youth his mother 
had to hold him back from imbibing too deeply of philosophical study – studium 
philosophiae acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano aut senatori, hausisse (Agric. 
4.3); Quintilian in Book 12 of the Institutio, laying down his specifications for a 
Romanus sapiens, who unlike a philosophus works non secretis disputationibus, 
sed rerum experimentis atque operibus (12.2.7), and directly contrasting Greek 
facility with theoretical praecepta and Roman strength in practical exempla 
(12.2.29-30); Aulus Gellius in Noctes Atticae 13.24 in similar vein holding up the 
elder Cato as an inspiration to frugality and endurance that he says he finds far 
superior to Graecae istorum praestigiae philosophari sese dicentium.   
 
The vision of philosophy as characteristically Greek in its over-refinement, as 
diversion and debilitation, as mere theory outshone by practical Roman 
achievement, is not one that goes away; this was a viewpoint constantly available 
for re-occupation, and clearly repeatedly found useful.  Taking this together with 
Lucian's satire, we now seem to have replaced our initial picture of a philosophy as 
a shared good of the cultivated elite, with an alternative picture of philosophy as a 
                                                
34 It is perhaps also significant that Dio is here comparing himself going to Rome ("I too 
endeavoured … ") with Socrates summoned to (semi-Hellenized) Macedonia by 
Archelaus. 
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locus of reciprocal scorn: Greeks sneering at Romans for mangling their 
involvement with philosophy because they constitutionally lack the insight and 
good taste to understand and value it correctly, and Romans replying that the best 
of them, at least, the most truly and securely Roman, deliberately hold back 
because they see and understand only too clearly what it involves, and do not want 
it.   
 
But this is once more too neat and simple, in a number of ways.  On the one hand, 
it needs to be underlined that what we are confronted with here are not universal 
and obligatory positions – 'the Roman' or 'the Greek view' (as if there could be 
such a thing) – but available options that might or might not be taken up in a given 
instance. In addition, we will surely miss the subtlety of the real situation, both 
with philosophia, and with senses of Greek and Roman identity, if we do not make 
the effort to relate this exercise in boundary drawing and stipulating national 
identities back to the broader picture of the status of philosophia as an element in 
high culture with which we began.  And the way to begin to take account of both 
these qualifications is to look more closely and carefully at the detail of what 
Tacitus, Gellius and Quintilian have to say, and the context in which they say it. 
 
With Gellius, the point is that the sneer at Graecae praestigiae and the 
hypocritical pretence of moral virtue is a fleeting one, just one note in the richer 
polyphony his miscellany.  The focus on Cato's morals in 13.24 is only one of 
many invocations of Cato, which more often highlight his Latinity and his 
oratorical prowess than his suspicions about Greek philosophy.  And the swipe at 
philosophy co-exists in the broader context of the Noctes with a much more 
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sympathetic and respectful engagement not only with classic philosophical texts 
(e.g. Plato's Gorgias in 10.22 and Symposium in 17.20), but also with 
contemporary and near-contemporary Greek and Greek-using philosophers: 
Epictetus for example in Noctes 9.1 and17.19, Musonius Rufus in 5.1, and above 
all the man Gellius himself studied with, the Athenian Platonist philosopher 
Calvenus Taurus.  There are moments when Gellius recalls an affectionate teasing, 
directed by philosopher Taurus at his rhetorically-minded pupil in the early days 
of their acquaintance – 'heus' inquit' tu, rhetorisce, …' in Noctes 17.20.4 – but 
Taurus's disquisitions to his pupils are nevertheless reported in loving and 
respectful detail (above all, Noctes 12.5).  It is from Gellius too, however, that we 
get the more ambiguous story of the Stoic philosopher caught in a storm at sea, 
taxed by his fellow travellers with showing apparently unStoic signs of distress, 
and defending himself by reference to the now missing fifth book of Arrian's 
Discourses of Epictetus (Noctes 9.1).  Exactly where sympathies are supposed to 
rest at the end of this story – with the philosopher, on the understanding that his 
self-exculpation is a reasonable and successful one, or with the sceptical 
onlookers, who think they have caught him in a failure to adhere to his principles – 
is unclear; but on either reading, it is an anecdote that adds a further nuancing 
layer to Gellius's presentation of philosophia and its adherents. 
 
In the case of Tacitus's Agricola, a look at the larger context shows that something 
more of a balancing act is being performed.  Philosophia is certainly characterised 
as something that a good Roman, looking forward to a public career, must be 
careful not to get too enmeshed in; and it was youthful over-enthusiasm (his 
incensus ac flagrans animus) that threatened to push Agricola over the line.  We 
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perhaps also catch a deliberate snub in Tacitus's choice of wording: as he phrases 
it, Agricola's enthusiasm was tempered not only by greater maturity (aetas), but 
also by ratio, reasoned thought – philosophy may claim to be all about ratio 
(lovgo", logismov"), Tacitus seems to suggest, but what truly reasonable thinking 
leads to is a moderation not an intensification of philosophical commitment.  But 
there are positive notes too.  It remains a tribute to Agricola's good character and 
high spirit that he became so enthusiastic for the pursuit of sapientia in the first 
place; and he did derive a real and lasting benefit from it, once things had been put 
in their proper proportion (retinuitque … ex sapientia modum).  Moreover, the 
Greek element in the surroundings in which Agricola grew up and received his 
early formation – the Graeca comitas of Marseilles, which is what was responsible 
for philosophy having been in the air around him – is a good thing.  And in the 
preface to the essay, just before we come on to the topic of Agricola's origins and 
early life, the persecution of philosophy and the bonae artes in general has been 
held up by Tacitus as a mark of the corrupt political order that has only just at the 
time of writing been put an end to by Nerva and Trajan.  Anything frowned on by 
bad Emperors cannot itself be all bad. 
 
The case of Quintilian, thirdly, is the most interestingly edgy and nuanced of all, 
thanks to the particular set of targets he sets himself in the Institutio.  Here too one 
gets the strong impression of a balancing act being carried out in what is being 
said about philosophia, in which a necessary commitment to a Greek-derived 
model of education, literacy and culture has to be held in tension with Roman self-
respect.  The ideal Roman orator, according to Quintilian, has no moral lessons to 
learn from the over-nice theorizing of Greek philosophers, and he simply cannot 
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afford to withdraw as they do from the real world of political engagement and 
achievement.  He is justified in this attitude not only by his own superior native 
Roman record of practical achievement and demonstrations of virtue in action, but 
also by the allegedly manifest hypocrisy and degeneracy of contemporary 
philosophers, whose arrogant assertion that only they are truly qualified to speak 
about moral topics is fatally undercut by their own failings (1 Praef. 15-19; 
12.3.11-12).  Yet philosophia and its classic Greek proponents cannot simply be 
removed from the curriculum that forms the orator.  Not only will the propaedeutic 
study of poetry (grammatica) be imperfect without a grasp of philosophical 
doctrines (1.4.4).  In the sphere of rhetorical education proper, both doctrinal 
knowledge and acquaintance with forms of philosophical argumentation are 
strongly advantageous, provided that the essential difference between lecture-
theatre and forum is kept firmly in mind (10.1.35-36); and classic Greek 
philosophical texts, from Plato and Xenophon to the old Stoics, are a fixture on his 
reading list (10.1.81-84), in a way that Roman philosophical writing simply cannot 
match (10.1.123-31). 
 
Of these three specimen Roman attitudinizings, it is Quintilian's that is most 
manifestly engaged in a work of containment.  The reasons why he finds himself 
in this position are not hard to see: principally because he writes explicitly as an 
educationalist, but also in part because of his political circumstances.  His topic is 
the training required to form the highest human type, the model of high 
achievement and the ideal life, and he speaks as one himself professionally 
engaged in the realization of this model.  But this is territory which everyone 
knows is claimed as its own by philosophia, and has been so claimed since Plato's 
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Republic, itself one of the formal models for Quintilian's treatise.  If oratory, and 
the training of the orator, are to be securely established where Quintilian wants to 
put them, on the moral and existential high ground, then the rival claim of 
philosophy has to be convincingly rebuffed.  But at the same time, there is another 
contrary risk to be avoided too.  Too extreme or absolute a rebuff to philosophia 
would be in danger of making oratory and the orator look both intellectually 
irresponsible, and criminally insensitive to one of the great achievements of 
civilized life.   
 
Politically, the significant factor is that Quintilian is writing under the Emperor 
whose public relations with philosophers were so condemned by Tacitus in the 
Agricola preface, on the strength of both the execution of philosophically 
motivated individuals such as Arulenus Rusticus and Herennius Senecio, and the 
collective expulsion of philosophical teachers in 93 AD.  Domitian was not the 
first to make a political target of philosophers – there had been individual 
banishments and executions under both Nero and Vespasian, and a collective 
expulsion under the latter in 71 – but the fact that this intermittent imperial habit 
had gone into its third round with him cannot but have influenced the atmosphere 
in which Quintilian wrote35. 
 
On both political and educational grounds, therefore, a middle course had to be 
steered, and Quintilian did this by a combination of means.  Playing the Roman 
card was one of them, and a strong one; but it was intertwined with others: the 
                                                
35 For the issue of the official persecution of philosophers, and the so-called 'philosophical 
opposition' to the Principate, see McMullen (1966) 46-90; Brunt (1975); Griffin (1989); 
Trapp (2007) 226-33. 
 24 
contrast between idle theorizing and real, effective practice; the distinction 
between the great classics of the honoured past of philosophy and the degenerate 
hypocrisy of its modern representatives; and the indignant rejection of the idea that 
philosophers have exclusive as opposed to shared rights to speak authoritatively 
about questions of morality and the good life. 
 
Quintilian, Gellius and Tacitus, then, all use the thought that philosophy is in the 
end too Greek as a way of declining to take it at its own high estimation of itself; 
but they all employ it as a tempering manoeuvre, rather than as a way of rejecting 
the activity and its practitioners categorically.  These Romans at least do not want 
to look boorish and under-educated by turning their backs on philosophy entirely, 
but they are distinctly keen to find ways of keeping it from getting above itself. 
 
A pervasive concern 
Romans restrict philosophy, and use a distinction between Greekness and 
Romanness as one particularly effective way of doing so.  Is it therefore wrong to 
have begun this chapter, as I did, by depicting philosophy as a shared product, 
uniting rather than dividing the cultured élite of the Empire?  Does the case of 
philosophy after all allow us to identify an important asymmetry between the 
Greek and the Roman?  The answer I want to suggest in conclusion is both a yes 
and a no.   
 
Yes, there is an asymmetry to be seen here in the linguistic and institutional 
bedding of philosophy, as described above; there is no getting away from that.  
Philosophical discourse was developed to a higher degree of sophistication in 
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Greek than in Latin, and was more institutionally at home in Greek-speaking 
cities.  On the high political level, this lesser integration both made possible and 
reinforced the periodic imperial edicts expelling the representatives of philosophia 
from the centre of power – a gesture that simply would not have been possible in a 
Greek context, even if the necessary power structure had existed to enable it.  But 
in another sense, it can be argued that there is less of an asymmetry than attention 
to surface attitudinizing might suggest.   
 
As we have seen, Roman unease about philosophy – about indulging it and 
indulging in it more than a certain distance – was expressed in other ways than 
simply in terms of its excessive Greekness.  The same function was performed by 
complaints about philosophical imperialism, its tendency to claim unrealistically 
exclusive rights over issues of virtue and right living; by complaints about the 
hypocrisy of philosophers; and by the drawing of a pointed contrast between the 
philosophical classics and their degenerate modern successors.  And these further 
complaints are, when one looks, not by any means unique to individuals writing in 
Latin or observing from a self-consciously Roman standpoint.  Greeks too in the 
early centuries AD can readily be seen expressing scepticism about the more 
aggressively imperialist claims of philosophy, and looking for what can be read as 
comparable strategies to blunt, deflect or sidestep them. 
 
Most obviously, Quintilian's desire to strike back on behalf of rhetoric, and push 
philosophy off both the educational and the political (the civic) high ground, is of 
course utterly familiar in a Greek context too.  This is the old sparring match 
between philosophy and rhetoric, first conceptualized and articulated by Plato, 
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endlessly replayable and replayed.  For a convenient Greek parallel, we do not 
need to look any further than Aelius Aristides, and his Orations 2 and 3, In 
Defence of Oratory and In Defense of the Four, composed in the later 140s AD.  
In these two pieces, Aristides takes issue with the contemptuous dismissal of 
public speaking delivered by Plato in the Gorgias, dealing first with the Platonic 
claim that there is no such thing as a true science (technê) of oratory (Or. 2), and 
secondly with the damning verdict delivered against the great Athenian orator-
politicians of the fifth century (Or. 3).  Like Quintilian, Aristides is careful to 
balance his rebuttal of the Platonic attack (in his eyes, a classic case of 
unwarranted philosophical aggression36) with an underlying reassurance that he 
respects the truths of a more temperate and reasonable philosophia as much as any 
man.  For instance, it is a central part of his closural strategy to argue that Plato is 
really an ally, and in fact agrees in spite of himself with the laudatory view of 
oratory37. 
 
But I would want to argue that, on the Greek side too, this clichéd confrontation is 
just one manifestation of a broader phenomenon.  In Greek-speaking as well as in 
Latin culture, philosophia was widely felt not only as a great Hellenic 
achievement, to be cherished, honoured and perpetuated, but also as in some 
measure a potential source of upset, requiring careful precautionary containment.  
Here was a body of thought and writing which both claimed privileged rights over 
the highest and deepest truth, and at the same time repeatedly set itself at an angle 
to everyday, conventional ways of thinking and doing, relativizing the pieties and 
convictions of the normal world to what it claimed as higher standards, and 
                                                
36 Aristides Or. 2.13, Plato in the Gorgias speaks filonikovteron tou' devonto". 
37 Aristides, Or. 2.438-61. 
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sometimes challenging them head-on.  Such an uncomfortable source of implicit 
and explicit criticism cried out for strategies of containment, ways of not being 
obliged always to contemplate this criticism squarely and with unqualified 
deference.  The greater entrenchment of philosophia and philosophoi in the elite 
paideia of the Greek half of the Empire, as both continuing activity and as an 
element in the accumulated cultural stock, only made the task the more serious, 
and efforts to respond to it all the more visible38. 
 
Viewed in this light, Greek culture of the early centuries AD can be seen to have 
come up with a variety of resourceful ways of hitting back at philosophy and 
philosophers, and finding grounds for not taking them and their calling at its own 
very high estimation of itself.  A very obvious element in this broader panorama of 
resistance and containment – perhaps in fact the most obvious, and certainly one 
not matched on the Roman side – is anti-philosophical satire, most prominently 
represented by the very same Lucian as we found castigating the Romans for not 
being receptive enough.  A simple page-count is enough to establish that the effort 
that Lucian put into making fun of boorish Romans was as nothing to that he 
devoted to satirizing the pretensions, hypocrisy and self-seeking of philosophoi, in 
such works as his Life-style Auction, Fisherman, Symposium and Hermotimus. 
 
Lucian's over-arching strategy in these works, however, is not one of blanket 
resistance and rejection.  In a manner related to what we have already seen with 
Quintilian and Aristides, he is careful to evince – and to show that he is 
                                                
38 See Trapp (2007) 233-56 for a more elaborate development of this perspective on 
Imperial period writing about philosophia. 
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presupposing in his audience – a broad knowledge of the (conventionally 
conceived) history of philosophia, and a cultivated connoisseur's affection for the 
literary riches of philosophical writing, even as he satirizes.  He writes as someone 
who wishes to be perceived as knowing and loving the best of Hellenic tradition, 
including its high thinkers and the masterpieces of philosophical literature, and 
whose amusement and disaffections should correspondingly be seen as aimed at 
particular aspects or uses of philosophia, not the whole phenomenon in itself.   
 
In theory, Lucian's combination of erudite appreciation of the philosophical 
classics with a satirist's scorn for their modern representatives might be dismissed 
as individual idiosyncrasy, rather than an indication of a more general current of 
opinion.  But the picture of Lucian as heroic critic – the lone voice of sanity in a 
world of blind acceptance – is itself open to challenge, as the product of an 
excessively romanticized view of the author.  The availability of the parallels just 
drawn with Quintilian and Aristides in their approach to philosophia and 
philosophoi might encourage us to reflect that Lucian wrote for a public, and can 
be presumed to have written what he believed that public was happy to hear.  The 
fact that he produced so much philosophical satire would then as readily suggest 
that he found enthusiastic consumers for his product, as that he was forced to 
continue his 'attacks' because his message was failing to get through.  In which 
case his satire becomes available, as I have suggested, as a symptom of one of the 
ways in which, in the Greek cultural zone in the early centuries AD, the place of 
philosophia in the world of the educated élite could be both celebrated and kept 
within comfortable boundaries. 
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This can then be connected with other currents and strategies.  For it seems 
reasonable to propose that not just Lucian's philosophically cultivated satire, but 
more generally the much wider range of what might be called Greek Imperial-
period philosophical belles letters, should be seen as the fruit of a comparable 
attempt to soften the felt threat of philosophia, without having to sever 
connections with it in any damaging or discreditable way.  On this view, the 
reason that there is so much philosophical rhetoric, or rhetorical philosophy, in 
Greek writing of the first three centuries AD, is that philosophy had 
simultaneously to be embraced and also neutralised – held close because of a 
perception of its high value, but at the same time made safe and normal, converted 
into an insider to normal educated culture from the transcendent critic of the 
conventional it threatened so consistently to become.  Dio Chrysostom, Favorinus, 
Maximus of Tyre, Menander Rhetor with his prescriptions for physics as 
declamation (in the physikos hymnos)39, even Plutarch in his more elaborately 
literary dialogues, all become collaborators in a project of making philosophy 
reassuringly compatible with conventional cultural and literary values – an insider 
to the Hellenic heritage – instead of their detached and unsettling critic. 
 
Home-grown Greek responses to the problem of philosophia, then, show a wider 
range of strategies than Roman, and more of an urge to control by means of a 
warm embrace, rather than by expressions of critical detachment.  This still allows 
the conclusion, however, that the case of philosophy in the Greco-Roman world of 
the Imperial period shows us an area of high culture which, because of its peculiar 
nature as an institution and an ideology, managed to combine both a large measure 
                                                
39 Men. Rhet. Treatise I, 336.25-337.32 Spengel. 
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of community between the Greek and the Roman halves of the ruling élite, and a 
number of fault-lines between the two.  In the ineradicable Greekness of 
philosophia, Roman commentators had one extra, locally specific way of putting 
up defences against its more extreme claims; but the unease from which this 
sprang, and the desire to keep philosophia under control, was shared.  In the end, 
far from diverging from their Greek-speaking contemporaries over philosophia, 
Roman commentators were in fact continuing a native Greek response, with the 
additional resource that for them, as not for the Greeks, it could be conceived as an 
import from a cultural as well as an intellectual outside. 
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